And because the presence of pesticide on the Johnsons' fields allegedly caused those fields to be decertified, the court of appeals held that the Johnsons had viable claims for damages based on 7 C.F.R. Weborganic - Page 14 - Food & Beverage Litigation Update The connection between actual and proximate causation, Aegis Insurance Services, Inc. v. 7 World Trade Co. V. UNITED . WebCase Brief (19,287) Case Opinion (19,683) Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Coop. 7 C.F.R. 205.202(b), and (2) denying the Johnsons' motion to amend their complaint to include claims for the 2008 incidents to the extent those claims are not based on trespass or 7 C.F.R. We review the district court's denial of a party's motion to amend a complaint for abuse of discretion. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006) ([T]he question is whether Congress intended its different words to make a legal difference. They must also certify on an annual basis that they have not sold products labeled as organic except in accordance with the OFPA, and producers must allow the certifying agent an on-site inspection of their farm every year. To the extent that the Johnsons' proposed amended complaint includes such claims, the district court properly denied the Johnsons' motion to amend. 6511(c)(2)(A) (prohibiting the sale of a product as organic if, upon inspection, it is determined that pesticide or nonorganic residue is present as a result of intentional application of a prohibited substance). If the investigation indicates that the residue detected on the organic product was the result of intentional application of a prohibited substance or the residue is present at levels that are greater than federal regulations prescribe, the product cannot be sold as organic. We hold that a trespass action can arise from a chemical pesticide being deposited in discernable and consequential amounts onto one agricultural property as the result of errant overspray during application directed at another. In Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Cooperative Oil Co., an organic farmer sued a member-owned farm products and services cooperative on claims including trespass, nuisance, and negligence after pesticide sprayed on conventional farm fields drifted onto the farmer's organic fields. The court looked outside Minnesota to support the holding it reached.8 Id. He specifically asked the cooperative to take precautions to avoid overspraying pesticide onto his fields when treating adjacent fields. The Johnsons sought a permanent injunction under the nuisance statute, Minn.Stat. But interpreting the regulation to allow for an automatic under-five-percent safe harbor for drift ignores this additional, more specific commentary: We do not speculate as to the Johnsons' damages, but we hold that the district court erroneously rejected their claims for lack of damages on the ground that, by virtue of there having been no finding of five-percent contamination, no damages could be proven. The Johnsons' remedy for the certifying agent's error was an appeal of that determination because it was inconsistent with the OFPA. (540) 454-8089. Respondents Oluf and Debra Johnson (Johnsons) were organic farmers. The district court here focused on our use of the term "particulate matter" in our discussing the nature of odors and, relying on the American Heritage Dictionary definition of "particulate matter," it concluded that pesticide drift is particulate matter and therefore not actionable as trespass under Minnesota law. 205.203(b) (2012) (The producer must manage crop nutrients and soil fertility); 7 C.F.R. We last address the district court's denial of the Johnsons' permanent injunction request. See id. 205.100, .102, .300 (2011); see also Minn. Stat. Appellant Paynesville Farmers Union Cooperative Oil Company (Cooperative) is a member owned farm products and services provider that, among other things, applies pesticides to farm fields. Rosenberg v. Heritage Renovations, LLC, 685 N.W.2d 320, 332 (Minn. 2004). Id. 2003), review denied (Minn. Aug. 5, 2003). at 388. The defendant's liability for nuisance is determined by balancing the social utility of the defendants' actions with the harm to the plaintiff. Highview N. Apartments, 323 N.W.2d at 71. 205.202(b), a third party's pesticide drift cannot cause a field to lose organic certification. Plaintiffs were farmers who grew organic crops. 6508(a). Trial court was correct in concluding that plaintiffstrespassclaim failed as a matter of law. 86, 342 P.2d 790, 793 (Or.1959) (suggesting that one explanation for the historical adherence to a distinction between tangible and intangible invasions of land was that science had not yet peered into the molecular and atomic world of small particles). To prove a negligence claim, the plaintiff must show that the defendant breached a duty of care that proximately caused the plaintiff damage. And similarly, the Washington Supreme Court held in Bradley v. American Smelting and Refining Co. that arsenic and cadmium particles emitted from a smelting plant and landing on the plaintiffs' land could also constitute a trespass. Because the Johnsons' interpretation nullifies part of the OFPA and the NOP, that interpretation is not reasonable, and we decline to adopt it. The distinction between trespass and nuisance should not be based on whether the object invading the land is tangible or intangible. 205.671. At FindLaw.com, we pride ourselves on being the number one source of free legal information and resources on the web. And we have held that errant bullets shot onto another's property constitutes a trespass. Because these identify at least potential bases to recover damages, see Highview N. Apartments v. Cnty. The plain language of the phraseAny field or farm parcel must: (b) Have had no prohibited substances applied to itindicates that the concern is what the land in question was exposed to, not how it was exposed, why it was exposed, or who caused the exposure. WebPaynesville Farmers Union Cooperative Oil Company :: Supreme Court of the United States :: Administrative Proceeding No. ] The court concludes that this regulation does not apply to the alleged conduct here because a pesticide is not applied to a farm if its presence is caused by drift, as opposed to being directly applied by the organic farmer. In June 2007, the Johnsons filed a complaint with the Minnesota Department of Agriculture (MDA), alleging that the Cooperative had contaminated one of their transitional soybean fields2 through pesticide drift. Finally, because trespass is an intentional tort, reasonableness on the part of the defendant is not a defense to trespass liability. Reading each provision of the regulation as an integrated whole, we therefore deduce that the phrase "applied to" refers to "applications" and that "applications" include even each "unintended application" and that the "application" of a prohibited substance includes "drift" onto a nontargeted field. of Mapleview, 293 Minn. 106, 10809, 196 N.W.2d 626, 62829 (1972); Huber v. City of Blue Earth, 213 Minn. 319, 322, 6 N.W.2d 471, 473 (1942). Based on this conclusion, the court reasoned that the presence of any amount of pesticide on the Johnsons' fields rendered the Johnsons noncompliant with 7 C.F.R. WebJohnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Cooperative Oil Co. EN. Minn. Stat. Learn more about FindLaws newsletters, including our terms of use and privacy policy. Drifted particles did not affect plaintiffs possession of the land. 7 C.F.R. Some particles are sufficiently large or dark to be observable, such as dust, dirt, soot, or smoke. United States Envtl. We have not specifically considered the question of whether particulate matter can result in a trespass. Appellant Paynesville Farmers Union Cooperative Oil Company (Cooperative) is a member owned farm products and services provider that, among The OFPA also specifically provides that producers of organic products shall not apply materials to seeds or seedlings that are contrary to, or inconsistent with, the applicable organic certification program. 7 U.S.C. 6511. WebPDF State of Minnesota Supreme Court 20-72 IN THE Supreme Court of the United States _____ JANET L. HIMSEL, ET AL., Petitioners, v. 4/9 LIVESTOCK, LLC, ET AL., Respondents. The district court granted summary judgment to the Cooperative and dismissed all of the Johnsons' claims. Agency, http://www .epa.gov/pm/ (last updated June 28, 2012). Minn.Stat. 31.925 (2010) (adopting the federal Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, 7 U.S.C. Yes. Defendant claimed that the invasion of particulate matter does not constitute atrespassin Minnesota as a matter of law. If the intrusion is to the interest in use and enjoyment of property, the law of nuisance applies.); see also J.D. The regulations require farmers to develop detailed production and handling practices that prevent the commingling of organic and nonorganic foods. We recognize that the assumption has some support from the following general commentary on the regulation: National Organic Program, 65 Fed.Reg. Copyright 2023, Thomson Reuters. 205.202(b), unambiguously means that the organic farmer intentionally applied the prohibited substance to the field. Id. In other words, the Johnsons did not market soybeans harvested from this field as organic for an additional 3 years. 6506(a)(4),(5). Special Force Ministries v. WCCO Television, 584 N.W.2d 789, 792-93 (Minn.App. Appellant Paynesville Farmers Union Cooperative Oil Company (Cooperative) was a member owned farm products and services provider that, among other things, applied pesticides to farm fields. Organic farmers Oluf and Debra Johnson filed a civil suit alleging that the Paynesville Farmers Union Cooperative Oil Company sprayed a chemical pesticide that drifted from pesticide-targeted fields onto theirs, and that this prevented them from selling their crops under a federal nonpesticide "organic" certification. But the district court should deny a motion to amend a complaint when the proposed claim could not survive a summary-judgment motion. 445 Minnesota Street, Suite 1400 . 7 U.S.C. . 205.202(b), and therefore that OCIA had discretion to decertify the Johnsons' fields. In January 2009, the Johnsons sued the cooperative for the 2005 and 2007 incidents. The Johnsons sought an injunction under the nuisance statute, Minnesota Statutes section 561.01. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Names & Likeness Licensing Litigation. JOHNSON v. PAYNESVILLE FARMERS UNION COOPERATIVE OIL COMPANY. 6511(c)(2)(A). The proper distinction between trespass and nuisance should be the nature of the property interest affected. Moreover, use of the passive voice generally indicates the focus of the language is whether something happenednot how or why it happened. Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 572, 129 S.Ct. Defendant was a company that sprayed pesticide on conventionally farmed fields adjacent to the plaintiffs fields. 802 N.W.2d at 391 (citing 7 C.F.R. Make your practice more effective and efficient with Casetexts legal research suite. 205.202(b). American organic farming is regulated by the Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, 7 U.S.C. On appeal from the decision to grant summary judgment, we review de novo the district court's application of the law and its determination that there are no genuine issues of material fact. 7 C.F.R. It is the right of the owner in possession to exclusive possession that is protected by an action for trespass. In other words, in order for products to be sold as organic, the organic farmer must not have applied prohibited substances to the field from which the product was harvested for a period of 3 years preceding the harvest.13. We hold that it can. See Borland, 369 So.2d at 527 (noting, the same conduct on the part of a defendant may, and often does, result in the actionable invasion of exclusive possession of the property and use and enjoyment). The Environmental Protection Agency defines particulate matter as a complex mixture of extremely small particles and liquid droplets made up of a number of components, including acids (such as nitrates and sulfates), organic chemicals, metals, and soil or dust particles. United States Envtl. The use of different words in the two provisions supports the conclusion that the sections address different behavior. Minn.Stat. Oil Co. Poppler v. Wright Hennepin Coop. WebOluf Johnson, et al., Respondents, vs. 51, 602 N.W.2d 215, 21819 (Mich.Ct.App.1999) ([P]ossessory rights to real property include as distinct interests the right to exclude and the right to enjoy, violations of which give rise to the distinct causes of action respectively of trespass and nuisance. (citing Keeton, supra, 87)); John Larkin, Inc. v. Marceau, 184 Vt. 207, 959 A.2d 551, 555 (Vt.2008) (holding that landowner who sprayed pesticide on his land that drifted onto plaintiff's land did not commit trespass because there was no evidence that the pesticide interfered with the plaintiff's right to exclusive possession of his land). Red River Spray Service, Inc. v. Nelson, 404 N.W.2d 332, 334 (Minn.App. He also notified commercial pesticide sprayer Paynseville Farmers Union Cooperative Oil Company of the transition. The MDA investigated and determined that the cooperative illegally sprayed herbicide, causing visually apparent tainting of the Johnsons' crops consistent with drift. Whether plaintiffstrespassclaim fails as a matter of law? The district court granted summary judgment and dismissed the Johnsons' trespass, nuisance, and negligence per se claims. But to the extent that the amended complaint alleges claims for the 2008 incidents that are not based in trespass or on 7 C.F.R. In a breach of contract case, the court can consider ordering specific performance as long as the innocent party asks for that remedy. 205.202(b). But the court of appeals reversed, holding that the phrase applied to it implicitly includes unintentional pesticide drift, and that therefore OCIA had discretion to decertify the Johnsons' soybean field under section 205.202(b). 7 U.S.C. And because there was discretion to decertify, the court of appeals concluded that the Johnsons had offered sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment. 817 N.W.2d 693, 712 (Minn. 2012). In other words, the tort of trespass is committed when a person intentionally enters or causes direct and tangible entry upon the land in possession of another. Dobbs, supra, 50 at 95 (footnotes omitted). See, e.g., Sime, 213 Minn. at 481, 7 N.W.2d at 328. 205.202(b), does not, however, end our analysis of those claims. Willmar tribune. 6511(d). See Rosenberg, 685 N.W.2d at 332. The court of appeals expansion of trespass law to include intangible matters may subject countless persons and entities to automatic liability fortrespassabsent any demonstrated injury. This is an appeal from summary judgment. We turn first to the portion of the Johnsons' nuisance and negligence per se claims that are based on 7 C.F.R. As to the negligence per se and nuisance claims based on 7 C.F.R. That section states only that if "residue testing detects prohibited substances at levels that are greater than 5 percent of the Environ-mental Protection Agency's tolerance for the specific residue detected or unavoidable residual environmental contamination, the agricultural product must not be sold, labeled, or represented as organically produced." The district court dismissed these claims on the ground that under Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Coop. In this section, the NOP requires that producers who have been certified as organic create buffers between the fields from which organic products will be harvested and other fields. 205.202(b). In addition, if unavoidable residual environmental contamination is present on the product at levels that are greater than those set for the substance at issue, the product may not be sold as organic. We review a district court's denial of a motion to amend a complaint for an abuse of discretion. The states may adopt the federal standards or they may impose more restrictive requirements governing products sold as organic. The Johnsons, organic farmers, claimed that while Appellant, a cooperative, was spraying pesticide onto conventionally farmed fields adjacent to the Johnsons' fields, some pesticide contaminated the Johnsons' organic fields. See 7 U.S.C. As to the trespass claim, the court of appeals concluded that the district court read too much into Wendinger. 2001). Here, the district court concluded that the Johnsons' amendments adding the 2008 claims would not withstand summary judgment for the same reasons that the 2007 claims for trespass, negligence per se, and nuisance failed. It was also inconsistent with the OFPA because the Johnsons presented no evidence that any residue exceeded the 5 percent tolerance level in 7 C.F.R. Total views 3. The district court initially issued a temporary injunction, but after dismissing the Johnsons' claims on the merits, it vacated that injunction and denied the Johnsons' request for a permanent injunction. Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. When people or tangible objects enter the plaintiff's land without permission, these entries disturb the landowner's right to exclusively possess her land. The cooperative again oversprayed in 2007. Id. We are not to adopt an interpretation that renders one section of the regulatory scheme a nullity. A10-1596, A10-2135 (Minn. Aug. 1, 2012). Under the plain terms of section 205.671, therefore, crops can be sold as organic even if testing shows prohibited substances on those crops as long as the amounts detected do not exceed 5 percent of EPA limits. Highview, 323 N.W.2d at 70. See Flom v. Flom, 291 N.W.2d 914, 917 (Minn.1980) (noting that to satisfy the element of proximate cause there must be a showing that the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury). Considered and decided by ROSS, Presiding Judge; STAUBER, Judge; and HARTEN, Judge. 205.202(b) (2012), a producer's intentional placement of pesticides onto fields from which crops were intended to be harvested and sold as organic was prohibited, but section 205.202(b) did not regulate the drift of pesticides onto those fields. (Emphasis added). 6507(b)(1). 6511(c)(2). It reasoned, "[A]s there is no evidence that chemical residue tests performed on the plants . Under the plain language of 7 C.F.R. 802 N.W.2d at 390. at 391. Wendinger v. Forst Farms, Inc., 662 N.W.2d 546 (Minn.App. Id. 6504, 6513. The Court also held that 7 C.F.R. 104 Wash.2d 677, 709 P.2d 782, 786-90 (1985). See 7 U.S.C. Not only is the rule from the Bradley and Borland courts inconsistent with our trespass precedent, but the rule in those cases also blurs the line between trespass and nuisance. Because we conclude that the Johnsons' trespass claim and claims for damages based on 7 C.F.R. Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Co-op. Don't Miss Important Points of Law with BARBRI Outlines (Login Required). This statute has been held to require "harm" to the plaintiff and "wrongful conduct" by the defendant. Borland, 369 So.2d at 529; accord Bradley, 709 P.2d at 791. 205 .202(b). Stay up-to-date with how the law affects your life. 192, 61 L.Ed. We next address the district court's conclusion that the Johnsons failed to allege damages, an essential element of their nuisance and negligence-per-se claims. The Johnsons took this action because they believed that the presence of any amount of pesticide on their organic fields prohibited them from selling crops harvested from these fields as organic. WebJohnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Cooperative Oil Co., 817 N.W.2d 693 (2012): Case Brief Summary - Quimbee Study Aids Case Briefs Overview Casebooks Case 205.202(b). Under that settlement, the cooperative paid damages and agreed to give the Johnsons 24 hours' notice before it sprayed in any adjacent field. 7 U.S.C. These findings were based exclusively on the predicate findings that the Johnsons failed to allege damages. They alleged that the drift has caused "substantial inconveniences" because they are required to report the contamination and it affects their crop rotations, organic-farm planning, and record keeping. WebMinnesota.gov Portal / mn.gov // Minnesota's State Portal In order to resolve the interpretation question presented, we must construe the regulation at issue7 C.F.R. The MDA found that the cooperative repeatedly applied pesticide on windy days. at 530 ([I]f, as a result of the defendant's operation, the polluting substance is deposited upon the plaintiff's property, thus interfering with his exclusive possessory interest by causing substantial damage to the res, then the plaintiff may seek his remedy in trespass ); cf. The MDA also reported that the chemicals diflufenzopyr and glyphosate were not present. The inconvenience and adverse health effects the Johnsons allege are the type of claims contemplated in Highview North Apartments, and if proven, they may affect the Johnsons' ability to use and enjoy their land and thereby constitute a nuisance. Plaintiffs sued defendant fortrespass. The Johnsons claimed that while the Cooperative was spraying pesticide onto conventionally farmed fields adjacent to the Johnsons fields, some pesticide drifted onto and contaminated the Johnsons organic fields. 205.202(b) (2012), (2) economic damages because they had to destroy some crops, (3) inconvenience, and (4) adverse health effects. Because the Cooperative was not, and could not be, the proximate cause of the Johnsons' damage, we hold that the district court properly granted summary judgment to the Cooperative on the Johnsons' nuisance and negligence per se claims based on section 205 .202(b). 7 U.S.C. The email address cannot be subscribed. Chemical Spray If the land is under lease, the lessee might be the person who has 774 F.3d 1185 - DRB NO. We decided in Wendinger that "invasive odors" that were emanating onto property from a neighboring confined-pig feeding operation could not be a trespass because the odors were part of transient fumes, which support an action for nuisance but not trespass. Similarly, section 205.400 does not support the Johnsons' proposed construction of section 205.202(b). When we read the phrase applied to it in 7 C.F.R. 541.07(7) (2010) (creating a 2year statute of limitations for all tort claims against pesticide applicators). The district court dismissed the Johnsons' request for injunctive relief because it concluded that the Johnsons did not have a viable nuisance claim under 7 C.F.R. See, e.g., Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Or. First, the language of section 205.202(b) is silent with respect to who applied the prohibited substances. 6511(c)(1). 205.201(a) (2012) (The producer or handler must develop an organic production or handling system plan); 7 C.F.R. The errant dispersion of pesticides, which contain chemicals designed to affect the land, can interfere with possession. WebOluf Johnson and Debra Johnson, Petitioners: v. Paynesville Farmers Union Cooperative Oil Company: Docketed: December 3, 2012: Linked with 12A377: Lower Ct: Supreme Court of Minnesota: Case Nos. Keeton, supra, 13 at 7172. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 37 S.Ct. The cooperative's counter position, which is that "applied to" does not include unintended residual drift from overspray, is belied by the express language of the regulation. The difference between ordinary negligence and negligence per se is that in negligence per se, a statutory duty of care is substituted for the ordinary prudent person standard such that a violation of a statute is conclusive evidence of duty and breach. Gradjelick v. Hance, 646 N.W.2d 225, 231 n. 3 (Minn.2002). Our review of cases from other jurisdictions reveals that courts have abandoned the distinction between trespass and nuisance, at least in part, because courts generally favor allowing parties to vindicate wrongs and, in many jurisdictions, actions for trespass have a longer statute of limitations than actions for nuisance. 13, at 71. WebCase brief Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Co-op Oil Comp., 817 N.W.2d 693 (2012) Facts: Appellant Paynesville Farmers Union Cooperative Oil Company is a It seems to me that differences in size, quantity, and harmfulness of varying types of particulate matter will have an effect on whether the invasion by the substance causes a trespass. Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993). Office of Appellate Courts . Case brief Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Co-op Oil Comp., 817 N.W.2d 693 (2012) Facts: Appellant Paynesville Farmers Union Cooperative Oil Company is a member owned farm that has products and services, among other things, applies pesticides to farm fields. Respondents Oluf and Debra Johnsons are organic farmers. But nothing in our Wendinger analysis indicates that we intended the term "particulate matter" to define a unique category of physical substances that can never constitute a trespass. KidCloverButterfly14. Johnson again notified the MDA in 2008 about the cooperative's spraying in July and August. Kevin F. Gray, Matthew W. Moehrle, Rajkowski Hansmeier, Ltd., St. There is no dispute about the Johnsons' rightful possession of their fields. WebCase brief Johnson .docx 3 pages Question 1- quiz.docx 1 pages PLST 201 Internet Assignment #3.docx 10 pages Final Research Project PLST 201.docx 2 pages garratt v dailey case brief.docx 10 pages Final Research Project - Copy.docx 2 pages Minn Minors.docx 1 pages Statutory Research Assignment plst 201 #1.docx 2 pages Case See, e.g., Caraco Pharm. 6511(c)(1). Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Coop. Specifically, if the residue is caused by environmental contamination, but does not exceed the requisite levels, the product may continue to be sold as organic. WebLeesburg Farmers Market. We reverse the district court's summary judgment order dismissing the Johnsons' trespass claim because pesticide drifting onto the Johnsons' farm may have constituted a trespass. In Minnesota, a trespass is committed where a plaintiff has the right of possession to the land at issue and there is a wrongful and unlawful entry upon such possession by defendant. All Am. In Bradley, the Washington Supreme Court held that particulate matter deposited on the plaintiff's land from the defendant's copper smelter could constitute a trespass. See Weston v. McWilliams Assocs., Inc., 716 N.W.2d 634, 638 (Minn. 2006). With respect to the nuisance claim, Minn.Stat. Before discussing the factual background of this case, it is helpful to briefly summarize the organic farming regulations at issue. 561.01 (2010) provides that a nuisance is [a]nything which is injurious to health, or indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property. An action seeking an injunction or to recover damages can be brought under the statute by any person whose property is injuriously affected or whose personal enjoyment is lessened by the nuisance. Id. 205.200 (2012) (The producer or handler must comply with the applicable provisions); 7 C.F.R. This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google. 205.202(b), the court of appeals disagreed with the district court's interpretation of the NOP regulations. WebThe Johnsons, organic farmers, claimed that while Appellant, a cooperative, was spraying pesticide onto conventionally farmed fields adjacent to the Johnsons' fields, some For example, if someone causes harmful dust to enter a person's land and that dust settles on the person's land and interferes with the owner's possession of the land, it would seem that a trespass has occurred. WebFinal Research Paper Case Brief 1 Citation: Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Co-op Oil Comp., 817 N.W. We conclude that they did not. Sime v. Jensen, 213 Minn. 476, 481, 7 N.W.2d 325, 328 (1942); see also Romans v. Nadler, 217 Minn. 174, 18081, 14 N.W.2d 482, 486 (1944) (citing Whittaker v. Stangvick, 100 Minn. 386, 111 N.W. To the extent that the court of appeals' decision would reinstate those claims and allow the Johnsons to amend their complaint to include those claims for the 2008 incidents of pesticide drift, we reverse. Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Coop. But section 205.202(b) does not regulate drift; instead, it provides that prohibited substances are not to be applied to organic fields. This conclusion flies in the face of our rules of construction as well as common sense. And we reverse the denial of the Johnsons' motion to amend their complaint and of their request for a permanent injunction because both denials were based on the same mistaken legal conclusions. Thus, while the court concludes that invasion by an intangible object never interferes with a property owner's possessory rights, I conclude that in some circumstances it may, particularly when that intangible object is actually a substance that settles on the land and damages it.